Space Shuttle Program Essay Example

Space Shuttle Program Essay This is an edited version of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report released in August, 2003. It provides a comprehensive and often sobering example of management lapses that have severe consequences. The original report was over 280 pages. This edited version eliminates the much of the technical discussion and focuses instead on the organizational factors that lead to the accident. You may obtain the entire report from http://www. caib. us/news/report/default. html I have included some sections for background. Read these sections to gain an overview of the accident and the report. I have included some pages simply to provide context for sections that relate to questions below. I have placed arrows in the text to indicate those sections that are most important. Here Questions to Consider: 1. According to the report, what were the causes of the Columbia accident? 2. What were the essential features of the culture at NASA? 3. Which factors played the greatest role in the events leading up to the accident: logical factors, such as schedule, technicalities of the shuttle design, testing, or psychological, such as politics, the perspective of deadlines? 4. What was the meaning of February 19, 2004? . How did February 19, 2004 contribute to the Columbia accident? 6. How did management and workforce differ in their perspective on the pressure to meet 2/19/04? Why did they differ? 7. What types of schedule management tools did NASA use? Were they effective? 8. What were the de facto priorities of the shuttle program leading up to the accident? 9. How did these prioriti es shape management’s perspective on â€Å"facts† presented by engineering after the launch of ST-107? 10. Which perspective on communication best explains the findings in the report: communication as information flow or communication as influence? 1. Which was most important in explaining the cultural factors leading up to the accident: a lack of management or a lack of leadership? Why? 12. What role did the management’s perception of NASA’s history play in the events leading up to the accident? 13. What role did a willingness to learn from mistakes play in the events leading up to the accident? 14. Given the example of the Navy’s reactor safety program, how could NASA correct these organizational deficiencies? 15. Could NASA managers have done a better job if they had followed Descartes’ four rules for thinking? Why? 6. What role did PowerPoint play in management’s failures? 17. How do the reports conclusions about leadership, cultu re, change, structure and risk apply to the management of everyday projects? COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD Report Volume I August 2003 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD COLUMBIA On the Front Cover This was the crew patch for STS-107. The central element of the patch was the microgravity symbol,  µg, flowing into the rays of the Astronaut symbol. The orbital inclination was portrayed by the 39-degree angle of the Earth? s horizon to the Astronaut symbol. We will write a custom essay sample on Space Shuttle Program specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on Space Shuttle Program specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on Space Shuttle Program specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer The sunrise was representative of the numerous science experiments that were the dawn of a new era for continued microgravity research on the International Space Station and beyond. The breadth of science conducted on this mission had widespread benefits to life on Earth and the continued exploration of space, illustrated by the Earth and stars. The constellation Columba (the dove) was chosen to symbolize peace on Earth and the Space Shuttle Columbia. In addition, the seven stars represent the STS-107 crew members, as well as honoring the original Mercury 7 astronauts who paved the way to make research in space possible. The Israeli flag represented the first person from that country to fly on the Space Shuttle. On the Back Cover This emblem memorializes the three U. S. human space flight accidents – Apollo 1, Challenger, and Columbia. The words across the top translate to: â€Å"To The Stars, Despite Adversity – Always Exploreâ€Å" Limited First Printing, August 2003, by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Subsequent Printing and Distribution by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Government Printing Office Washington, D. C. 2 Report Volume I August 2003 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD COLUMBIA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Columbia Accident Investigation Board? s independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board? s 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft? s debris. In the process, Columbia? s tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U. S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. The Board recognized early on that the accident was probably not an anomalous, random event, but rather likely rooted to some degree in NASA? s history and the human space flight program? s culture. Accordingly, the Board broadened its mandate at the outset to include an investigation of a wide range of historical and organizational issues, including political and budgetary considerations, compromises, and changing priorities over the life of the Space Shuttle Program. The Board? s conviction regarding the importance of these factors strengthened as the investigation progressed, with the result that this report, in its findings, conclusions, and recommendations, places as much weight on these causal factors as on the more easily understood and corrected physical cause of the accident. The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod ramp section of the External Tank at 81. seconds after launch, and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced CarbonCarbon panel number 8. During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, fai lure of the wing, and breakup of the Orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the current design of the Orbiter, there was no possibility for the crew to survive. The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle Program? s history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision for human space flight. Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements); organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and Report Volume I d Here stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organization? rules. This report discusses the attributes of an organization that could more safely and reliably operate the inherently risky Space Shuttle, but does not provide a detailed organizational prescription. Among those attributes are: a robust and independent program technical authority that has complete control over specifications and requirements, and waivers to them; an independent safety assurance organization with line authority over all levels of safety oversight; and an organizational culture that reflects the best characteristics of a learning organization. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as â€Å"before return to flight. † These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board? s findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not â€Å"before return to flight† recommendations, they can be viewed as â€Å"continuing to fly† recommendations, as they capture the Board? s thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term. These recommendations reflect both the Board? s strong support for return to flight at the earliest date consistent with the overriding objective of safety, and the Board? s conviction that operation of the Space Shuttle, and all human spaceflight, is a developmental activity with high inherent risks. A view from inside the Launch Control Center as Columbia rolls out to Launch Complex 39-A on December 9, 2002. August 2003 9 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD COLUMBIA CHAPTER 5 From Challenger to Columbia The Board is convinced that the factors that led to the Columbia accident go well beyond the physical mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3. The causal roots of the accident can also be traced, in part, to the turbulent post-Cold War policy environment in which NASA functioned during most of the years between the destruction of Challenger and the loss of Columbia. The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s meant that the most important political underpinning of NASA? s Human Space Flight Program – U. S. -Soviet space competition – was lost, with no equally strong political objective to replace it. No longer able to justify its projects with the kind of urgency that the superpower struggle had provided, the agency could not obtain budget increases through the 1990s. Rather than adjust its ambitions to this new state of affairs, NASA continued to push an ambitious agenda of space science and exploration, including a costly Space Station Program. If NASA wanted to carry out that agenda, its only recourse, given its budget allocation, was to become more efficient, accomplishing more at less cost. The search for cost reductions led top NASA leaders over the past decade to downsize the Shuttle workforce, outsource various Shuttle Program responsibilities – including safety oversight – and consider eventual privatization of the Space Shuttle Program. The program? budget was reduced by 40 percent in purchasing power over the past decade and repeatedly raided to make up for Space Station cost overruns, even as the Program maintained a launch schedule in which the Shuttle, a developmental vehicle, was used in an operational mode. In addition, the uncertainty of top policymakers in the White House, Congress, and NASA as to how long the Shuttle would fly before being replaced resulted in the delay of upgrades needed to make the Shuttle safer and to extend its service life. The Space Shuttle Program has been transformed since the late 1980s implementation of post-Challenger management changes in ways that raise questions, addressed here and in later chapters of Part Two, about NASA? s ability to safely Report Volume I operate the Space Shuttle. While it would be inaccurate to say that NASA managed the Space Shuttle Program at the time of the Columbia accident in the same manner it did prior to Challenger, there are unfortunate similarities between the agency? s performance and safety practices in both periods. . 1 THE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT AND ITS AFTERMATH The inherently vulnerable design of the Space Shuttle, described in Chapter 1, was a product of policy and technological compromises made at the time of its approval in 1972. That approval process also produced unreasonable expectations, even myths, about the Shuttle? s future performance that NASA tried futilely to fulfill as the Shuttle became â€Å"operational† in 1982. At first, NASA was abl e to maintain the image of the Shuttle as an operational vehicle. During its early years of operation, the Shuttle launched satellites, performed on-orbit research, and even took members of Congress into orbit. At the beginning of 1986, the goal of â€Å"routine access to space† established by President Ronald Reagan in 1982 was ostensibly being achieved. That appearance soon proved illusory. On the cold morning of January 28, 1986, the Shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds into its climb towards orbit. On board were Francis R. Scobee, Michael J. Smith, Ellison S. Onizuka, Judith A. Resnick, Ronald E. McNair, Sharon Christa McAuliffe, and Gregory B. Jarvis. All perished. Rogers Commission On February 3, 1986, President Reagan created the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, which soon became known as the Rogers Commission after its chairman, former Secretary of State William Rogers. The Commission? s report, issued on June 6, 1986, concluded that the loss of Challenger was caused by a failure of the joint and seal between the two lower segments of the right Solid Rocket Booster. Hot gases blew past a rubber O-ring in the joint, leading to a structural failure and the explosive burnAugust 2003 99 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD COLUMBIA ing of the Shuttle? s hydrogen fuel. While the Rogers Commission identified the failure of the Solid Rocket Booster joint and seal as the physical cause of the accident, it also noted a number of NASA management failures that contributed to the catastrophe. The Rogers Commission concluded â€Å"the decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Communication failures, incomplete and misleading information, and poor management judgments all figured in a decision-making process that permitted, in the words of the Commission, â€Å"internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers. † As a result, if those making the launch decision â€Å"had known all the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch. † Far from meticulously guarding against potential problems, the Commission found th at NASA had required â€Å"a contractor to prove that it was not safe to launch, rather than proving it was safe. 1 The Commission also found that NASA had missed warning signs of the impending accident. When the joint began behaving in unexpected ways, neither NASA nor the Solid Rocket Motor manufacturer Morton-Thiokol adequately tested the joint to determine the source of the deviations from specifications or developed a solution to them, even though the problems frequently recurred. Nor did they respond to internal warnings about the faulty seal. Instead, Morton-Thiokol and NASA management came to see the problems as an acceptable flight risk – a violation of a design requirement that could be tolerated. During this period of increasing uncertainty about the joint? s performance, the Commission found that NASA? s safety system had been â€Å"silent. † Of the management, organizational, and communication failures that contributed to the accident, four related to fau lts within the safety system, including â€Å"a lack of problem reporting requirements, inadequate trend analysis, misrepresentation of criticality, and lack of involvement in critical discussions. †3 The checks and balances the safety system was meant to provide were not working. Still another factor influenced the decisions that led to the accident. The Rogers Commission noted that the Shuttle? s increasing flight rate in the mid-1980s created schedule pressure, including the compression of training schedules, a shortage of spare parts, and the focusing of resources on near-term problems. NASA managers â€Å"may have forgotten–partly because of past success, partly because of their own well-nurtured image of the program–that the Shuttle was still in a research and development phase. †4 The Challenger accident had profound effects on the U. S. pace program. On August 15, 1986, President Reagan announced that â€Å"NASA will no longer be in the business of launching private satellites. † The accident ended Air Force and intelligence community reliance on the Shuttle to launch national security payloads, prompted the decision to abandon the yet-to-be-opened Shuttle launch site at Vandenberg Air Force Base, and forced the development of improved expendable launch vehicles. 6 A 1992 White House advisory committee concluded that the recovery from the Challenger 100 Report Volume I SELECTED ROGERS COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS â€Å"The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint and seal must be changed. This could be a new design eliminating the joint or a redesign of the current joint and seal. No design options should be prematurely precluded because of schedule, cost or reliance on existing hardware. All Solid Rocket Motor joints should satisfy the following: †¢ â€Å"The joints should be fully understood, tested and verified. † †¢ â€Å"The certification of the new design should include: †¢ Tests which duplicate the actual launch configuration as closely as possible. †¢ Tests over the full range of operating conditions, including temperature. †¢ â€Å"Full consideration should be given to conducting static firings of the exact flight configuration in a vertical attitude. † †¢ â €Å"The Shuttle Program Structure should be reviewed. The project managers for the various elements of the Shuttle program felt more accountable to their center management than to the Shuttle program organization. † †¢ â€Å"NASA should encourage the transition of qualified astronauts into agency management positions. † †¢ â€Å"NASA should establish an Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance to be headed by an Associate Administrator, reporting directly to the NASA Administrator. It would have direct authority for safety, reliability, and quality assurance throughout the agency. The office should be assigned the work force to ensure adequate oversight of its functions and should be independent of other NASA functional and program responsibilities. † †¢ â€Å"NASA should establish an STS Safety Advisory Panel reporting to the STS Program Manager. The charter of this panel should include Shuttle operational issues, launch commit criteria, flight rules, flight readiness and risk management. †¢ â€Å"The Commission found that Marshall Space Flight Center project managers, because of a tendency at Marshall to management isolation, failed to provide full and timely information bearing on the safety of flight 51-L [the Challenger mission] to other vital elements of Shuttle program management †¦ NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate this tendency at Marshall Space Flight Center, whether by changes of personnel, organization, indoctrinat ion or all three. † †¢ â€Å"The nation? s reliance on the Shuttle as its principal space launch capability created a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the flight rate †¦ NASA must stablish a flight rate that is consistent with its resources. †5 disaster cost the country $12 billion, which included the cost of building the replacement Orbiter Endeavour. 7 It took NASA 32 months after the Challenger accident to redesign and requalify the Solid Rocket Booster and to return the Shuttle to flight. The first post-accident flight was launched on September 29, 1988. As the Shuttle returned to flight, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight August 2003 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD COLUMBIA Richard Truly commented, â€Å"We will always have to treat it [the Shuttle] like an RD test program, even many years into the future. I don? t think calling it operational fooled anybody within the program †¦ It was a signal to the public that shouldn? t have been sent. †8 The Shuttle Program After Return to Flight After the Rogers Commission report was issued, NASA made many of the organizational changes the Commission recommended. The space agency moved management of the Space Shuttle Program from the Johnson Space Center to NASA Headquarters in Washington, D. C. The intent of this change was to create a management structure â€Å"resembling that of the Apollo program, with the aim of preventing communication Read Here deficiencies that contributed to the Challenger accident. 9 NASA also established an Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance at its Headquarters, though that office was not given the â€Å"direct authority† over all of NASA? s safety operations as the Rogers Commission had recommended. Rather, NASA human space flight centers each retained their own safety organizatio n reporting to the Center Director. In the almost 15 years between the return to flight and the loss of Columbia, the Shuttle was again being used on a regular basis to conduct space-based research, and, in line with NASA? original 1969 vision, to build and service a space station. The Shuttle flew 87 missions during this period, compared to 24 before Challenger. Highlights from these missions include the 1990 launch, 1993 repair, and 1999 and 2002 servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope; the launch of several major planetary probes; a number of Shuttle-Spacelab missions devoted to scientific research; nine missions to rendezvous with the Russian space station Mir; the return of former Mercury astronaut Senator John Glenn to orbit in October 1998; and the launch of the first U. S. elements of the International Space Station. After the Challenger accident, the Shuttle was no longer described as â€Å"operational† in the same sense as commercial aircraft. Nevertheless, NASA continued planning as if the Shuttle could be readied for launch at or near whatever date was set. Tying the Shuttle closely to International Space Station needs, such as crew rotation, added to the urgency of maintaining a predictable launch schedule. The Shuttle is currently the only means to launch the already-built European, Japanese, and remaining U. S. odules needed to complete Station assembly and to carry and return most experiments and on-orbit supplies. 10 Even after three occasions when technical problems grounded the Shuttle fleet for a month or more, NASA continued to assume that the Shuttle could regularly and predictably service the Station. In recent years, this coupling between the Station and Shuttle has become the primary driver of the Shuttle launch schedule. Whe never a Shuttle launch is delayed, it impacts Station assembly and operations. In September 2001, testimony on the Shuttle? achievements during the preceding decade by NASA? s then-Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Flight William Readdy indicated the assumptions under which NASA was operating during that period: Report Volume I The Space Shuttle has made dramatic improvements in the capabilities, operations and safety of the system. The payload-to-orbit performance of the Space Shuttle has been significantly improved – by over 70 percent to the Space Station. The safety of the Space Shuttle has also been dramatically improved by reducing risk by more than a factor of five. In addition, the operability of the system has been significantly improved, with five minute launch windows – which would not have been attempted a decade ago – now becoming routine. This record of success is a testament to the quality and dedication of the Space Shuttle management team and workforce, both civil servants and contractors. 11 5. 2 THE NASA HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT CULTURE Though NASA underwent many management reforms in the wake of the Challenger accident and appointed new directors at the Johnson, Marshall, and Kennedy centers, the agency? powerful human space flight culture remained intact, as did many institutional practices, even if in a modified form. As a close observer of NASA? s organizational culture has observed, â€Å"Cultural norms tend to be fairly resilient †¦ The norms bounce back into shape after being stretched or bent. Beliefs held in common throughout the organization resist alteration. †12 This culture, as will become clear acros s the chapters of Part Two of this report, acted over time to resist externally imposed change. By the eve of the Columbia accident, institutional practices that were in effect at the time of the Challenger accident – such as inadequate concern over deviations from expected performance, a silent safety program, and schedule pressure – had returned to NASA. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE Organizational culture refers to the basic values, norms, beliefs, and practices that characterize the functioning of a particular institution. At the most basic level, organizational culture defines the assumptions that employees make as they carry out their work; it defines â€Å"the way we do things here. † An organization? culture is a powerful force that persists through reorganizations and the departure of key personnel. The human space flight culture within NASA originated in the Cold War environment. The space agency itself was created in 1958 as a response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik, the first artificial Earth satellite. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy charged the n ew space agency with the task of reaching the moon before the end of the decade, and asked Congress and the American people to commit the immense resources for doing so, even though at the time NASA had only accumulated 15 minutes of human space flight experience. With its efforts linked to U. S. -Soviet competition for global leadership, there was a sense in the NASA workforce that the agency was engaged in a historic struggle central to the nation? s agenda. The Apollo era created at NASA an exceptional â€Å"can-do† culture marked by tenacity in the face of seemingly impossible challenges. This culture valued the interaction among August 2003 101 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD COLUMBIA research and testing, hands-on engineering experience, and a dependence on the exceptional quality of the its workforce and leadership that provided in-house technical capability to oversee the work of contractors. The culture also accepted risk and failure as inevitable aspects of operating in space, even as it held as its highest value attention to detail in order to lower the chances of failure. The dramatic Apollo 11 lunar landing in July 1969 fixed NASA? s achievements in the national consciousness, and in history. However, the numerous accolades in the wake of the moon landing also helped reinforce the NASA staff? s faith in their organizational culture. Apollo successes created the powerful image of the space agency as a â€Å"perfect place,† as â€Å"the best organization that human beings could create to accomplish selected goals. †13 During Apollo, NASA was in many respects a highly successful organization capable of achieving seemingly impossible feats. The continuing image of NASA as a â€Å"perfect place† in the years after Apollo left NASA employees unable to recognize that NASA never had been, and still was not, perfect, nor was it as symbolically important in the continuing Cold War struggle as it had been for its first decade of existence. NASA personnel maintained a vision of their agency that was rooted in the glories of an earlier time, even as the world, and thus the context within which the space agency operated, changed around them. As a result, NASA? s human space flight culture never fully adapted to the Space Shuttle Program, with its goal of routine access to space rather than further exploration beyond low-Earth orbit. The Apollo-era organizational culture came to be in tension with the more bureaucratic space agency of the 1970s, whose focus turned from designing new spacecraft at any expense to repetitively flying a reusable vehicle on an ever-tightening budget. This trend toward bureaucracy and the associated increased reliance on contracting necessitated more effective communications and more extensive safety oversight processes than had been in place during the Apollo era, but the Rogers Commission found that such features were lacking. In the aftermath of the Challenger accident, these contradictory forces prompted a resistance to externally imposed changes and an attempt to maintain the internal belief that NASA was still a â€Å"perfect place,† alone in its ability to execute a program of human space flight. Within NASA centers, as Human Space Flight Program managers strove to maintain their view of the organization, they lost their ability to accept criticism, leading them to reject the recommendations of many boards and blue-ribbon panels, the Rogers Commission among them. External criticism and doubt, rather than spurring NASA to change for the better, instead reinforced the will to â€Å"impose the party line vision on the environment, not to reconsider it,† according to one authority on organizational behavior. This in turn led to â€Å"flawed decision making, self deception, introversion and a diminished curiosity about the world outside the perfect place. †14 The NASA human space flight culture the Board found during its investigation manifested many of these characteristics, in particular a self-confidence about NASA possessing unique knowledge about how to 102 Report Volume I safely launch people into space. 15 As will be discussed later in this chapter, as well as in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, the Board views this cultural resistance as a fundamental impediment to NASA? s effective organizational performance. 5. AN AGENCY TRYING TO DO TOO MUCH WITH TOO LITTLE A strong indicator of the priority the national political leadership assigns to a federally funded activity is its budget. By that criterion, NASA? s space activities have not been high on the list of national priorities over the past three decades (see Figure 5. 3-1). After a peak during the Apollo program, when NASA? s budget was almost four percent of the federal budget, NASA? s budget since the early 1970s has hovered at one percent of federal spending or less. 4. 0 3. 5 Percent of Federal Budget 3. 0 2. 5 2. 0 1. 5 1. 0 0. 5 0. 0 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 Figure 5. 3-1. NASA budget as a percentage of the Federal budget. (Source: NASA History Office) Particularly in recent years, as the national leadership has confronted the challenging task of allocating scarce public resources across many competing demands, NASA has had difficulty obtaining a budget allocation adequate to its continuing ambitions. In 1990, the White House chartered a blue-ribbon committee chaired by aerospace executive Norman Augustine to conduct a sweeping review of NASA and its programs in response to Shuttle problems and the flawed mirror on the Hubble Space Telescope. 6 The review found that NASA? s budget was inadequate for all the programs the agency was executing, saying that â€Å"N ASA is currently over committed in terms of program obligations relative to resources available–in short, it is trying to do too much, and allowing too little margin for the unexpected. †17 â€Å"A reinvigorated space program,† the Augustine committee went on to say, â€Å"will require real growth in the NASA budget of approximately 10 percent per year (through the year 2000) reaching a peak spending level of about $30 billion per year (in constant 1990 dollars) by about the year 2000. Translated into the actual dollars of Fiscal Year 2000, that recommendation would have meant a NASA budget of over $40 billion; the actual NASA budget for that year was $13. 6 billion. 18 During the past decade, neither the White House nor Congress has been interested in â€Å"a reinvigorated space program. † Instead, the goal has been a program that would continue to August 2003 2001 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD COLUMBIA produce valuable scientific and symbolic payoffs for the nation without a need for increased budgets. Recent budget allocations reflect this continuing policy reality. Between 1993 and 2002, the government? s discretionary spending grew in purchasing power by more than 25 percent, defense spending by 15 percent, and non-defense spending by 40 percent (see Figure 5. 3-2). NASA? s budget, in comparison, showed little change, going from $14. 31 billion in Fiscal Year 1993 to a low of $13. 6 billion in Fiscal Year 2000, and increasing to $14. 87 billion in Fiscal Year 2002. This represented a loss of 13 percent in purchasing power over the decade (see Figure 5. -3). 19 1. 50 The lack of top-level interest in the space program led a 2002 review of the U. S. aeros

Alpha Decay Nuclear Reaction Example Problem

Alpha Decay Nuclear Reaction Example Problem This example problem demonstrates how to write a nuclear reaction process involving alpha decay. Problem: An atom of 241Am95 undergoes alpha decay and produces an alpha particle.Write a chemical equation showing this reaction. Solution: Nuclear reactions need to have the sum of protons and neutrons the same on both sides of the equation. The number of protons must also be consistent on both sides of the reaction.Alpha decay occurs when the nucleus of an atom spontaneously ejects an alpha particle. The alpha particle is the same as a helium nucleus with 2 protons and 2 neutrons. This means the number of protons in the nucleus is reduced by 2 and the total number of nucleons is reduced by 4.241Am95 → ZXA 4He2A number of protons 95 - 2 93X the element with atomic number 93According to the periodic table, X neptunium or Np.The mass number is reduced by 4.Z 241 - 4 237Substitute these values into the reaction:241Am95 → 237Np93 4He2

Meaning and Origin of the Last Name Cunningham

Meaning and Origin of the Last Name Cunningham The Scottish surname  Cunningham  has more than one possible meaning or etymology: A place name from the Cunningham area in the Ayrshire district of Scotland, which, in turn, got its name from the words cunny or coney, meaning rabbit and hame, meaning home (rabbits home).Another possible translation is that the name derived from cuinneag, meaning milk pail along with the Saxon ham, meaning village.An Irish  surname adopted from the Scottish by bearers of Gaelic Ó Cuinneagin, meaning descendant of Cuinneagn, a personal name from the Old Irish personal name Conn, meaning leader or chief. Cunningham is one of the 100 most common  surnames in Scotland. Surname Origin:  Scottish, Irish Alternate Surname Spellings:  Cunnyngham, Konningham, Koenigam, Cunningham, Coonaghan, Counihan, Cunnighan, Kinningham, Kinighan, Kinagam, Kinnegan, Maccunnigan, Conaghan, Kinaghan Where is the Cunningham Surname Found? According to WorldNames public profiler, the Cunningham surname is most commonly found in Ireland, especially the Donegal, North East, and West regions. Outside of Ireland, the Cunningham surname is most popular in Scotland, followed by Australia and New Zealand. The surname distribution maps at Forebears puts the greatest density of people with the Cunningham surname in Northern Ireland, followed by Jamaica, Ireland, and Scotland. Famous People with the Surname Cunningham: Andrew Cunningham - British admiral of World War IIGlenn Cunningham - American distance runnerMerce Cunningham - American dancer and choreographerRedmond Christopher Archer Cunningham -  the only Irishman to receive the Military Cross on D-DayWalter Cunningham - NASA astronaut and  Lunar Module pilot on the first manned Apollo mission (Apollo 7) ​Genealogy Resources for the Surname Cunningham: Cunningham Irish ClanA website devoted to providing historical content on the Cunningham surname and serving as a platform to connect Cunningham individuals around the world. Cunningham Family Genealogy ForumSearch this popular genealogy forum for the Cunningham surname to find others who might be researching your ancestors, or post your own Cunningham surname query. Cunningham Family DNA ProjectThis Y-DNA project includes over 180 members interested in using DNA testing to help prove a family connection between Cunninghams and related surnames when a paper trail cannot be established. FamilySearch - CUNNINGHAM GenealogyExplore over 2.5 million results, including digitized records, database entries, and online family trees for the Cunningham surname and its variations on the FREE FamilySearch website, courtesy of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. CUNNINGHAM Surname Family Mailing ListsRootsWeb hosts several free mailing lists for researchers of the Cunningham surname. DistantCousin.com - CUNNINGHAM Genealogy Family HistoryFree databases and genealogy links for the last name Cunningham. The Cunningham Genealogy and Family Tree PageBrowse genealogy records and links to genealogical and historical records for individuals with the Cunningham surname from the website of Genealogy Today. - References: Surname Meanings Origins Cottle, Basil. Penguin Dictionary of Surnames. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967. Hanks, Patrick and Flavia Hodges. A Dictionary of Surnames. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Hanks, Patrick. Dictionary of American Family Names. New York:  Oxford University Press, 2003. MacLysaght, Edward.  Surnames of Ireland. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1989. Smith, Elsdon C. American Surnames. Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1997.

Discuss the Ways in which the Terms Freedom, Risk and Individuality Essay

Discuss the Ways in which the Terms Freedom, Risk and Individuality were Invoked by post-WWII American Artists and Critics - Essay Example Thus, from 1940s American artists developed something unique which illustrated the American political, economic and social forms of expression. Americans in general also became aware of an increase in crimes, which the mass media, represented by photographers, filmmakers and journalists, revealed to them. They came to know that ideas and feelings could be better expressed through art forms and abstract expressionism. Thus, the concept of abstract expressionism evolved, which marked the turning point in American art history. So far it relates to abstract expressionism in painting, it uses a means where in the artists apply paint rapidly on huge canvasses and express their feelings, emotions and gestures in a non geometric form. After the World War II, American artists have remained engrossed in the development of abstract art. Significant among such artists are Robert Motherwell, Norman Lewis and Mark Rothko who have contributed greatly to the development of the technique of abstract expressionism. It is mainly characterized by eminent factors. ... Abstract expressionists always make it a point to portray rich meanings and their works are a combination of both fluid washes as well as violent strokes of paint. â€Å"Rothko's fluid washes of paint, for example, stand in contrast to De Kooning's energetic, nearly violent brushstrokes. Yet both artists believed strongly in the ability of art to evoke powerful and meaningful emotions in the viewer† (Post World War II par. 3). It appears to a viewer that the painting is a chance painting or is simply an accident painting but such type of paintings is highly planned and has rich meanings, boiling beneath the surface, which the painter has visualized and intends to communicate to the world. Mark Rothko’s sienna, orange and black on dark brown and browns over dark are popular canvases. The USA’s experience in the World War II demonstrates the conflict which existed between the American values and the geopolitical exigencies. President Franklin D Roosevelt has delive red the famous ‘four freedom’ address where people possess certain freedom such as the freedom to speech, worship, want and the right to remain free from fear. Norman Rockwell, another eminent abstract expressionist painter, has immortalized the concept of four freedoms in a series of paintings in the Saturday Evening Post. â€Å"Works representing emancipated blacks from an album of photographs taken by the war artist James Taylor reveal an indeterminate, still somewhat displaced status for those recently freed by the Union Army† (Kromm & Bakewell 240). Photographs, especially made and dispersed by antislavery societies in order to celebrate the victorious escapes of slaves by contrast, raised the performance and unusual

The Future of Muslim Brotherhood Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

The Future of Muslim Brotherhood - Essay Example What influenced the development of Muslim Brotherhood throughout the world is a shared set of religious values in which the basic social sentiment is that Islam should be the guiding force for a society as well as in governing the social lifestyle of people (El-Sherif, 2014). In the Middle East, Islam is the most dominant religion with substantial devotion and following by society members practicing its ideology (Knudsen, 2003). Islamists believe that the Quran’s guiding principles could satisfy the divine, thus serving as the most relevant political model for a society in order to ensure that devoted precepts of the Quran are the fundamental goals of society (El-Sherif, 2014; Knudsen, 2003). To not establish Islamist values in society and politics is considered unfavorable secularism and unfaithfulness to Islam. In fact, their inability to achieve this communion is quite unfavorable for the devoted Islamist. Hence, it adds pressure to establish the Muslim Brotherhood througho ut the world. The development of this ideology is a modern belief or idea that the practice of conservative Islamic values and liberalism can successfully be reconciled in a single political governance system which can be used to guide the society and allow the state to function well in a globalized world (El-Sherif, 2014). In relation to the political and social revolutions in Egypt, this study aims to determine whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt could maintain long-term support from the local citizens.

Boy-Actresses and the Character of Rosalind in As You Like It :: Shakespeare As You Like It Essays

Boy-Actresses and the Character of Rosalind in As You Like It      Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   When Shakespeare wrote his plays, women were not permitted to perform on stage, so boys played all of the female characters.   Unlike many apprenticeships, a boy learning to become an actor had no set age at which to begin and no set length of how long to study, but they usually began around the age of ten and continued playing women or adolescent roles for about seven years.   These boys were apprenticed to a specific actor within an acting group, and were not attached to the organization as a whole.   There was a very strong teacher-pupil relationship between the adult actor and the boy, but there was also very often a father-son relationship.   The boys usually lived in the adult actors home with his family.   The idea of an apprentice is not difficult to imagine, but for many modern audiences, a boy playing the role of a women is very difficult to picture.   This picture is even more difficult to see when examining the plays of Shakespeare and the str ong female characters that he often depicts.   (Bentley 117)    In Shakespeare's As You Like It, Rosalind has many layers and acts as a character taking on many different roles.   The idea that there is a boy playing a woman disguised as a man pretending to be a woman for wooing, is one that is confusing and yet makes sense.   What adds to this is the idea that Rosalind, disguised as Ganymede, is pretending to be Rosalind, not another woman, but herself.   One can see that she occasionally slips from the role of Ganymede pretending, to being Rosalind, with comments such as "And I am your Rosalind" (Norton 4.1-56) and "By my life, she will do as I do" (Norton 4.1-135).   In these instances it is as though Rosalind forgets that she is disguised as a man, but what does this mean for the actor playing her character?   For one it shows that he must be clear as to which role of the character he was playing.   As one can imagine    "An audience would be confused unless the performer, regardless of gender, made it clear when Rosalind herself was speaking, when the character was speaking as Ganymede, and when Ganymede was the stereotyped 'Rosalind'"   (Shapiro 122).    This idea brings up the versatility that the boy must have had in order to play such a role.

Describe how the body responds to stress Essay

Acute stress causes the arousal of the autonomic nervous system (ANS). The ANS comprises of the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) which prepares the individual for ‘fight or flight’ and the parasympathetic branch, which returns the individual to their original state of relaxation. Part of the SNS response is the sympathetic adrenal system (SAM), this system along with the SNS is collectively called the sympathomedullary pathway. The SNS is activated when the neurotransmitter noradrenaline is released and travels to the organs of the body preparing them for rapid action. Common responses to this would be increased heart rate, increased pupil size and metabolic changes such as a release of glycogen into the blood stream. In conjunction with the SNS, the SAM is also activated by an acute stressor causing adrenaline to be released into the blood stream, allowing the body to prepare for fight or flight. The SAM is regulated by both the SNS and the adrenal medulla. The adrenal medulla, which can be found in the adrenal gland near the kidneys, has two distinct zones, the adrenal medulla in the middle and the adrenal cortex around the outside. Neurons from the SNS travel to the medulla, so that when it is activated it releases adrenaline into the bloodstream. This adrenaline then has widespread effects on the physiological systems in the body e.g. boosting the supply of oxygen to the brain, and suppressing non-emergency bodily processes such as digestion. The parasympathetic nervous system will become active once the stressor has passed in order to relax the individual again and to re-start bodily functions that may have been repressed during the stressful period. The body deals with more long-term stress differently as it could not function long-term if it were to constantly be in the aroused via the ANS. The body uses the pituitary-adrenal system to regulate chronic physical or emotional stress, a process that takes about 20mins to complete. Once the body has identified the stressor as being chronic that information stimulates the hypothalamus which is responsible for controlling the body’s hormonal systems. Activation of a particular region of the hypothalamus, the paraventricular nucleus (PVN) leads to the production of a chemical messenger, corticotrophin-releasing factor (CRF), which is released into the bloodstream in response to the stressor. On arrival at the anterior lobe of  the pituitary gland, CRF causes the pituitary to produce and release adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH). From the pituitary, ACTH is transported in the bloodstream to its target site in the adrenal glands, located on top of the kidneys. ACTH then causes the adrenal cortex to release cortisol which has several effects on the body. Primarily it gives the individual a burst of energy and lowers their sensitivity to pain, however it also impairs cognitive performance, increases blood pressure and lowers the immune system. The pituitary-adrenal system is self-regulating with both the hypothalamus and pituitary glands using receptors to regulate the amount of CRF and ACTH in the body to maintain an appropriate level of cortisol in the bloodstream. Outline and evaluate research into life changes as a source of stress (6+6 marks) Rahe et al (1970) – wanted to study normal people (i.e. not ill people) to see if the number of life changing events was positively correlated with illness. They used a military sample of 2700 naval men aboard 3 US Navy ships. They were all given a questionnaire (the SRE) just before they started a tour of duty which was based on the SRRS that Holmes and Rahe had originally devised. The questionnaire asked them about all the life events they had experienced over the previous 6 months. After about 7 months of duty they were given an illness score which was calculated based on the number, type and severity of all illnesses recorded during the tour of duty. Rahe et al found a positive correlation of +.118 between the life changing units (LCU) score they received from the SRE before going on tour, and the illness score they received following the tour. A high LCU score shows that the individual had b een through significant amounts of stress (either positive or negative), and so a positive correlation with their illness score would suggest that experiencing stressful life changes does lead to more problems with health. Michael and Ben-Zur (2007) – studied 130 men and women, half of whom had been recently divorced and half recently widowed. They looked at levels of life satisfaction and unsurprisingly found that in the widowed group there was a higher satisfaction before their bereavement than after their loss. However, in the separated group they found the opposite, that individuals in fact reported more life satisfaction following their divorce than they had had before the separation. There are  several ways to explain this as it may be the result of a more positive outlook now they felt more in control of their lives instead of being ‘restricted’ by a partner, or perhaps they were now dating or living with someone new who made them feel happier. The SRRS suggests that any life-changing event has the potential to be harmful to health; however critics like Jones and Bright (2001) claim that in fact it is the quality of the event which dictates its impact. Undesired, unschedule d and uncontrolled events seem to be the ones which cause greatest negative effect. The key flaw in the SRRS is that it ignores individual differences, as different people will view the same life event as creating different levels of stress for them based on their situation, personality etc. For example the death of a partner may be devastating for one person but a blessed relief for another and yet both people would be given the same LCU score. Therefore it is not suitable to use a standard method of categorising individual stress levels when everyone is different. There is an issue of reliability in life change research as it is retrospective meaning reports may not be accurate or consistent as they are based on memory which can prove unreliable. Brown (1974) suggests that people who are unwell may feel the need to provide an explanation for their illness, and therefore are more likely to report stressful events than those who are not ill. Indeed Rahe’s research of Naval personnel relied on the participants accurately recording life events prior to their tour of duty but some may have forgotten events, while others may have over-elaborated, which would have ultimately affected their scores. Discuss two explanations of why people conform (4+4 marks) Normative Social Influence – deciding to comply through conformity without adopting that viewpoint. This may be as a result of feeling pressure from a majority and not wanting to be rejected from a group by dissenting as humans strive to develop and maintain social companionship. Therefore dissenting behaviour would risk social rejection and may damage relationships so we avoid it by conforming. Informational Social Influence – Conforming to others due to a genuine belief that they are right. This would involve not just compliant behaviour but also a change in our own thought processes to align with those of the majority thinking. This is most likely to happen when a situation is ambiguous, a crisis, or we believe others to be experts. Normative social influence is particularly effective when a group has low quality inter-personal relationships. Garandeau and Cillessen (2006) found that people in these types of groups may be manipulated by a skilful bully so that victimisation of another child provides the group with a common goal. This suggests that the effectiveness of normative social influence is dependent on the type of relationships within the group. Informational social influence may explain the development and maintenance of social stereotypes. Wittenbrink and Henly (1996) found that participants exposed to negative comparison information about African Americans (which was presented as the majority view) later reported more negative beliefs about a black target individual. This suggests that we can be persuaded to alter our viewpoint permanently that we will continue to stick to the new view even in other contexts. There is evidence to support the idea that we seek information from other in ambiguous situat ions in order to form our own opinion. Fein et al (2007) found that political opinions of individuals shifted after showing them the reactions of others while watching a political debate. This suggests that when a situation has no obvious answers we look to others to help us create a judgement. Outline and evaluate research into obedience (6+6 marks) Following the execution of Adolf Eichmann in 1963 for his part in the murder of Jewish people during the Holocaust, Milgram was interested to see whether Adolf’s defence that he was ‘only obeying orders’ had any real truth to it. He advertised for male volunteers to take part in a study into the how punishment affects learning. He offered all of the 40 participants who took part $4.50 and told them they would receive their payment even if they didn’t complete the full study. In addition to the participants there were also two confederates who were playing the role of the experimenter (an authority figure) and the learner. On arrival the participant and confederate were asked to draw straws for who would be learner and who would be teacher but this was rigged so that the participant was always the teacher. The participant was then told that he would be asking the learner a series of questions and if he got the answers wrong then the participant would give hi m an electric shock by pressing a the appropriate level button which would administer the shock to the learner in the next room. The shock  machine consisted of a range of buttons all labelled with voltage and a brief description of what that voltage level means e.g. 300v Intense Shock. The participant was also shown that the machine worked by being shown the learner receiving a mild shock. Initially Milgram had prepped the learner to get most of the questions wrong and told him to receive his shocks silently up until 300v when he was to bang on the wall and give no response to the next question. The learner was told to then repeat this at 315 volts, and from them on say and do nothing in response to the shocks. Milgram had also asked the experimenter to give prods to the participants if they asked to stop e.g. ‘It is absolutely essential that you continue’. Before the experiment Milgram had asked psychiatrists, college students and colleagues to predict how far they thought participants would go before refusing to obey. Consistently they all predicted that very few would go beyond 150 volts and only 4% would reach 300 volts. They also predicted only a pathological fringe of about 1 in 1000 would go up to 450 volts. In fact, 65% of the participants in his initial experiment continued to 450 volts and all of them went up to 300 volts with only 12.5% of them stopping at that point. One of the major criticisms of the Milgram study is related to the ethical issues it raised. Milgram deceived participants by lying about the purpose of the study which means true informed consent was not given. However, Milgram argued that the experiment would not have worked if they had known its purpose. Secondly, although he offered them the right to withdraw it can be argued that this was cancelled out by the prods that the experimenter gave to the participants, which may have made them doubt whether they could discontinue the experiment. Baumrind (1964) also attacked Milgram’s research saying that he had placed the participants under great emotional strain, causing psychological damage. Milgram responded by saying he couldn’t have predicted the level of strain the experiment would cause and he fully debriefed participants after the experiment and again a year later and in fact found that 74% felt they had learnt something of personal importance from the experience. Milgram’s experiment was lab-based which meant it was not a true test of whether obe dience would occur in real-life. Hofling et al (1966) conducted a study on nurses to see if they would follow an order from a doctor that contravened hospital regulations. They found that all but one of the 22 participants did as they were told and obeyed the  order they were given, suggesting that even in a real-life setting obedience levels are similar to that of Milgram’s findings. However, Jacobson (1975) conducted a similar real-life study but used a well-known drug and allowed the nurses to consult with each other before making a decision (which is a more realistic representation of hospital practices). He found that the obedience level dropped to just 11%, suggesting that people in real-life aren’t actually as obedient as Milgram’s lab results showed. Discuss the role of minority influence in social change (6+6 marks) Minority Influence – Moscovici (1976) believed that it was not only majority influence that led to groups being able to exert pressure on individuals. He said that without an outspoken minority advocating a different way of doing things, we would have no innovation or social change. This suggests that an individual who is exposed to a persuasive argument under certain conditions, they may change their own views to match those of the minority. There are four conditions necessary for social change to come about via minority influence 1) Drawing attention to an issue – when an issue is drawn to our attention via a minority it creates a conflict of views which we become motivated to reduce through various resolution methods which in turn draw further attention to the issue making it more likely to gain further exposure. 2) The role of conflict – when a minority view cannot be easily dismissed as obviously abnormal it forces us to examine their arguments more closely. This may not cause a complete shift to the minority view but it will cause an individual to re-examine and perhaps have a more balanced view of a given situation, which may in turn weaken the majority view over time if the minority view continues to spread 3) Consistency – If arguments are presented consistently by a minority then they will be taken more seriously, as the assumption is that the view holder must really believe that what they a re saying is true 4) The augmentation principle – If it is risky to hold a particular viewpoint and yet a minority still does then they will be taken more seriously by others in the group because they appear willing to suffer for their views. This will then lead to the impact of their position on other groups members to be increased or ‘augmented’ which may make them more influential in bringing about social change. The suffragettes are a classic example of how minority influence can bring about social change. All four of the necessary conditions needed for social change to occur via minority  influence can be seen in the way they campaigned for rights for women. They drew attention to their issue by employing educational, political and occasionally militant tactics. The role of conflict was seen when members of the majority started to move their views in line with the new way of thinking that the suffragettes were proposing. The suffragette message was consistent regardless of the attitudes of others over a 15 year period and even when they were jailed for civil disobedience. The suffragettes also showed that they were willing to suffer for the cause by risking imprisonment and even death from hunger strike, causing people from the majority viewpoint to start to augment their views with those of the campaigners. As a general rule, most people will go along with the crowd and maintain the status quo which puts minority groups at a distinct disadvantage as they lack social power and are seen by the majority as ‘deviant’. People will often avoid agreeing with a minority view as they then risk being seen as different themselves which has a negative connotation. This suggests that minority influence is latent, creating the potential for change rather than actual change. Describe one research study that has investigated the duration of STM (6 marks) Peterson and Peterson in 1959 aimed to conduct a piece of research which would study the duration of the short-term memory. They created a lab experiment which they believed would allow them to monitor how long a piece of information could be held in the STM without rehearsal. They used an opportunity sample of 24 students from the university that they worked at in the US and tested their recall using an independent measures design. The research began the test by saying a consonant syllable (nonsense trigram) followed by a three-digit number e.g. WJF 872. They were careful to ensure that the consonant syllable had no obvious meaning which would make it easier to remember e.g. BBC. As soon as the participant had heard the three-digit number they had to start counting backwards in threes from that number until told to stop. The idea behind this difficult counting task was to stop the participants being able to rehearse the consonant syllable, thus keeping it in their STM for longer and aiding recall. Each participant was given two practice trials to get used to the experiment and then 8 trials where the results were recorded. On each of the trials the retention  interval (time spent counting backwards) increased: 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 or 18 seconds. The Peterson’s found that when the retention interval was only 3 seconds, about 90% of the participants could accurately recall the consonant syllable but when the interval was 18 seconds only about 2% could recall it. The conclusion made by the Petersons was that STM lasts for approximately 20 seconds without rehearsal before the information is lost from the store. Outline one strength of using a case study to study memory and one weakness of using a case study to study memory (6 marks) Strength – One strength of using case studies to study memory is that they allow researchers to gather lots of rich data over a long period of time (that is both quantitative and qualitative) about a specific unique case of brain damage. In the study of HM, researchers were able to gather information about all aspects of HM’s memory problems allowing them to draw conclusions about STM and LTM that may not have been possible from simply studying ‘healthy’ brains. This suggests that being able to study brains that have been damaged and so don’t work properly allows researchers to make conclusions about how a healthy brain works. Weakness – One weakness of using case studies to study memory is that they are often focused on someone who has suffered a trauma leading to brain damage which affects their memory. The problem with this is that it does not allow researchers to gain data from before the trauma making comparisons difficult and therefore it is harder to draw conclusions. In the case of KF who had suffered a motorcycle accident which affected his STM the researchers could not establish whether the level of trauma he had experienced, the actual brain damage he had suffered, or simply KF’s memory ability prior to the accident, were the cause of his STM problems. This suggests that the results of case studies on memory lack internal validity and so cannot be generalised to a wider population. Outline and evaluate the multi-store model of memory (6+6 marks) The Multi-store model of memory (MSM) was proposed by Atkinson and Shriffin in 1968 and aims to illustrate how information is processed in our brains in order to form memories. The model states that information enters the sensory memory store (SM) from the environment via the 5 senses. The SM has a large capacity but a very limited duration meaning that information is almost  immediately forgotten unless it is paid attention to. If attention is paid then the information will move into the short-term memory (STM) which is another temporary store, although the duration is slightly longer than the SM as information will remain for about 20 seconds before being forgotten. However, if maintenance rehearsal is used (repeating the information over and over either out loud or in your head) then information will remain in the STM for longer. The STM generally uses acoustic encoding due to the process of rehearsal and it can hold roughly 5-9 chunks of information at any one time. If the information is then added to by using elaborative rehearsal to make the information more meaningful then it will move into the long-term memory (LTM). The LTM has an infinite capacity and duration and tends to use semantic encoding. Once information has been stored in the LTM it can be retrieved for later use via the STM. There is also research evidence to support the concept of there being separate unitary stores within memory. Beardsley (1997) and Squire et al (1992) studied the brain using brain scanning techniques and found that when the short-term memory is being used for a task then the prefrontal cortex is active and when the long-term memory is being used for a task then the hippocampus is active. This suggests that there are indeed different stores for memory and that separate parts of the brain are active when they are being used . There is evidence to suggest that STM and LTM are not in fact unitary stores. Shallice and Warrington (1970) studied KF, a brain damaged patient, and found that he struggled to process verbal information in the STM but had no impairment with processing of visual information in this store. This suggests that the STM is in fact not one single store but may be made up of multiple components which undermines the MSM’s proposal of unitary stores. There is also evidence to suggest that the STM and LTM are not in fact separate stores but may work together to process information. Ruchkin et al (2003) found that the brains of participants recalling lists of real words more active than the brains of those recalling pseudo-words. He concluded that this was because the real words were being processed using previous knowledge and experience from the LTM whereas the pseudo words (which have no meaning) were only processed by the STM. This suggests that the linear relationship between STM and LTM in the MSM is not accurate and that in fact the STM may actually be part of the LTM. Outline and evaluate the working memory model (6+6 marks) The Working Memory Model (WMM) was proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) they aimed to explain how information is processed in the bit of the memory that is used when an individual is working on a complex task. The basis of their model was that the STM was not just one single store but in fact is made up of several components. This was based on the fact that people seem to be able to perform two taks with equal accuracy simultaneously unless similar types of processing are required (e.g. two visual tasks at the same time). The first element to their model is the central executive (CE) which coordinates all the information the memory working memory system receives. It decides where to send incoming information which is received from the senses or the LTM and has to do this efficiently as it has limited capacity. There are three slave systems which operate under the CE, one of which is the Phonological Loop (PL). The PL was further subdivided by Baddeley in 1986 to form the phonologica l store (PS) and the articulatory process (AP). The PS stores any information which the individual hears, like an inner ear, while the AP uses the inner voice to silently repeat the information the individual has heard or seen (maintenance rehearsal). Another slave system is the visuo-spatial sketchpad which is used for planning spatial tasks and temporarily storing visual or spatial information. The final slave system is the episodic buffer which was added to the model in 2000 by Baddeley as he realised that the model lacked a general store which could hold both visual and acoustic information for more than a few seconds. Information from the other two slave systems, the CE and the LTM can be stored in the episodic buffer to create a complete memory which can then be transferred to the LTM for more permanent storage. Evidence from brain-damaged patients supports the WMM’s proposal of different stores for different types of processing in the STM. Shallice and Warrington (1970) studied KF who, following a motorcycle accident , had problems with some aspects of his STM. He seemed to be able to recall visual material quite well but struggled if information was presented acoustically. This suggests that the brain damage KF suffered may have been restricted to his phonological loop, supporting the WMM’s multi-component STM. However, there is also criticism of the CE as some feel that the notion of it being one single store is not accurate. Eslinger and  Damasio (1985) studied EVR who had suffered brain damage during an operation to remove a brain tumour. He still performed well on reasoning tasks but had problems with decision-making. This suggests that only part of his CE was intact and therefore shows that the explanation provided by the WMM of the CE being a single store is not complex enough. A further weakness of the WMM is that much of the research that has been conducted to evidence it comes from case studies. This is a problem as no ‘before and after’ comparisons can be made so it is not clear what actually caused the damage seen. This is evidenced in the case by Shallice and Warrington (1970) of KF who had problems with his STM. It was unclear whether the memory issues KF had were a result of previous memory ability, the trauma of the accident or the damage to his brain. This sug gests that case study evidence lacks validity and so should not be used to evidence the WMM as a general explanation for memory. Evaluate research on cultural variations in attachment (6 marks) The Strange Situation was created by an American psychologist and is based on the US viewpoint of what constitutes ‘normal’ attachment behaviour. Rothbaum et al (2000) claimed that much of attachment theory and research is based in American culture and so using it to evaluate cross-cultural differences is not a fair comparison. This suggests that secure attachment, as outlined in Ainsworth’s research, is not the ideal attachment type to have. This means gaining figures about attachment types from various cultures and labelling them, according to a western viewpoint, is an imposed etic which labels behaviours negatively when actually they may simply fit with the cultural norms of that particular country. There is an alternative explanation for why attachment may seem to have universalities across cultures. Van Ijzendoorn and Kroonenberg (1988) suggested that the similarities in attachment behaviours across cultures may also be explained in terms of mass media promoting an ‘ideal’ perception of parenting. This might suggest that similarities in attachment are not due to innate biological influences but are a result of an increasingly globalised world which is receiving similar messages from the mass media. There may be problems with researcher bias in research that aims to explore cultural variations in attachment. Researchers tend to be studying their own culture e.g. Ainsworth’s Strange Situation research in Baltimore, which can lead to assumptions being made based on the previous knowledge of the culture they are researching. The opposite problem  can occur when a researcher undertakes research in a foreign culture e.g. Ainsworth in Uganda. The problem here can be the interpretation of data by the researcher, especially if there is a language barrier as important details may be lost in translation. This suggests that a major flaw with all attachment research is that multiple cultures can never be studied truly objectively.